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Authors’ Note: A portion of this article appeared in 2006 in the
Wisconsin Lawyer magazine. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors and not of Mr. Jerry Teague, whom Ms. Hanan repre-
sented on appeal in Teague v. Bad River Band, nor of the Forest County
Potawatomi Community, which Mr. Levit represented in the Mohr
litigation described herein.  
Footnotes 
1. 2000 WI 79, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709 (“Teague II”).
2. Teague II, 2000 WI 79, ¶ 2.
3. Id. at ¶ 6.
4. Id. at ¶ 7.
5. Id. at ¶ 8.
6. Id. at ¶ 9.
7. Id. at ¶ 11.
8. 6 Wis. 2d 154, 94 N.W.2d 161 (1959).
9. Id. at ¶ 15.
10. Id. at ¶ 2.  The Court of Appeals decision, 229 Wis.2d 581, 593-
94, 599 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1999), is referred to as Teague I.
11. Id. at ¶ 2.
Eleven federally recognized Indian tribes are located inWisconsin. When civil disputes arise between tribal andnon-tribal members, one of the first questions is which
court has jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ quarrel. It may be
that both the state and tribal courts have jurisdiction, such that
the next question is, which court should proceed? Over the
past several years, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, using both
its decision-making and rule-making powers, along with sus-
tained, cooperative efforts of tribal and state court judges, has
devised various rules and guidelines by which many inter-
jurisdictional issues can be decided.
Decisions by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Teague v. Bad
River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians1 resulted in juris-
dictional allocation protocols for the two judicial districts
where the bulk of the state’s Indian tribes are located.  More
recently, the state Supreme Court approved statutory guide-
lines for a less formal discretionary transfer of state court cases
to tribal courts within Wisconsin.
Other states may wish to use one or both mechanisms for
assigning or transferring jurisdiction between tribal and state
courts. To better explain the Wisconsin experience and to help
readers identify areas of possible jurisdictional overlap, this
article first will describe some of the procedural background of
Teague and of the first case to apply the Teague protocol. Then
we discuss the more recent development of the discretionary
transfer rule.
BACKGROUND OF THE TEAGUE CASES
Jerry Teague, a non-tribal member, was employed under
contract as general manager of the Bad River Band’s casino.
After he was terminated, Teague filed suit in Ashland County
Circuit Court, seeking to compel arbitration.2 Early on, the
Circuit Court determined that the Band had waived sovereign
immunity. The Band asserted that Teague’s employment con-
tracts were invalid because they lacked the required tribal
council and federal approval.3
Over a year into Teague’s suit, the Band filed its own action
in Bad River Tribal Court, seeking to invalidate the employ-
ment contracts and reasserting its claim that the requisite
approval was lacking.4 The Band asked the Circuit Court for a
stay until the Tribal Court ruled on the tribal law challenges to
the contracts and until all tribal remedies were exhausted.5
The Circuit Court denied a stay because the Tribal Court
action would not entirely dispose of Teague’s claim. The
Circuit Court acknowledged that the Tribal Court could
address the limited issue of actual authority before the Circuit
Court resolved the rest of the case.6 The Band then amended
its Tribal Court complaint, adding that the Tribal Court should
invalidate the contracts based on apparent authority.
For reasons not clear from the record, Teague’s trial counsel
accepted service of the amended Tribal Court complaint but
did not plead responsively in Tribal Court. The Tribal Court
granted the Band’s motion for default judgment on the ground
that the contracts were invalid.7
The Band sought full faith and credit in the Circuit Court
for the Tribal Court default judgment, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §
806.245. But the Court declined to grant full faith and credit
based on a “prior action pending” rule.8 As the Circuit Court
understood things, the Tribal Court, a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, did not properly have jurisdiction over the matter
because the case was filed first in state court. After an Ashland
County jury found Teague’s employment contracts valid, an
arbitrator awarded him over $390,000 in damages. The Band
appealed.9
The Court of Appeals (in “Teague I”) reversed.10 On review,
the Supreme Court agreed that the “prior action pending” rule
did not apply to a court of an independent sovereign.
Principles of comity, however, required that the state and tribal
courts confer and allocate jurisdiction between them, so as to
avoid a race to judgment and the inconsistent results that had
occurred. The Supreme Court remanded for a novel interjuris-
dictional conference.11
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12. Teague III, at ¶ 69.
13. See Teague III, at ¶¶ 5, 92.
14. See Teague III, at ¶ 91 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
15. See Teague III, at ¶¶ 5, 92.
16. 2003 WI 118.
17. Judge Brunner is now on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District
III, but remains involved with a group of Wisconsin tribal and
state court judges that meets to promote understanding and coop-
eration between those courts.
18. See Teague III, at ¶ 5.
19. Historic State Court-Tribal Court Agreement to be Signed at Bad
River Reservation, http://www.wicourts.gov/news/archives/
2001tribal120401.htm.  
20. See id.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over
tribal courts within this state. So the Teague II Court exercised
its authority over the Circuit Court by ordering it to invite the
Tribal Court judge to a unique meeting. As envisioned, the two
judges virtually would step back in time to the point when
they had first learned of the parties’ parallel actions. The
judges then would discuss applicable comity concerns and
decide which court should have proceeded to exercise its juris-
diction and which court should have refrained. This joint
meeting, dubbed a “jurisdictional allocation conference” and
now known colloquially as a “Teague Conference,” can be used
to divide jurisdiction between state and tribal courts when the
parties are identical and there is issue overlap.
WISCONSIN’S FIRST JURISDICTIONAL ALLOCATION
CONFERENCE – COMITY IN ACTION
Comity is a doctrine of respect for the proceedings of
another system of government, reflecting a spirit of coopera-
tion. Comity recognizes the sovereignty and sovereign inter-
ests of each governmental system and its unique features,
including cultural and religious values. Overall, grants of
comity are discretionary, highly fact specific, and reviewable on
appeal for an erroneous exercise of discretion.12
At the March 2001 jurisdictional allocation conference, the
Band asked the Circuit Court to reopen its judgment approv-
ing the arbitration award. The parties also considered a draft
proposed protocol then under discussion by a forum of state,
federal and tribal judges. The draft protocol proposed particu-
lar comity factors that should be weighed at a jurisdictional
allocation conference.13
The conference was held on the record at the Ashland
County Courthouse with both judges and lawyers for each
party. In extensive discussion, each judge explained his view of
the proceedings that had transpired in his court.14 The Circuit
Court judge discussed the comity principles identified by the
Teague II Court, as well as the principles set forth in the
forum’s draft protocol and in an alternative proposal submitted
by the Wisconsin Tribal Judges Association (WTJA).15 After
almost two hours of colloquy, stalemate remained. Both courts
declined to reopen their respective judgments.16
THE FIRST TRIBAL/STATE COURT JURISDICTIONAL
ALLOCATION PROTOCOL IS APPROVED
The Band appealed again, and the Court of Appeals certified
the case to the Supreme Court. While Supreme Court review
was pending, Chief Judge Edward Brunner of the Tenth
Judicial District17 convened an ad hoc committee to develop a
tribal/state protocol governing the exercise of jurisdiction
between Wisconsin state courts and tribal courts within his
district. The committee’s final version was a meld – it retained
portions of the forum’s draft
proposed protocol, and added
other considerations identi-
fied in the WTJA draft.18
The protocol signed by the
Tenth Judicial District and
four Chippewa tribes (Bad
River, Lac Courte Oreilles, St.
Croix and Red Cliff) in
December, 2001, was the first
of its kind.19 The Protocol sets
forth the following factors to
be considered in allocating
jurisdiction:
(1) Whether there are issues
which directly touch on or require interpretation of a
Tribe’s Constitution, By-Laws, Ordinances or Resolutions;
(2) Whether the nature of the case involves traditional or cul-
tural matters of the Tribe;
(3) Whether the action is one in which the Tribe is a party, or
where tribal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or territory is an
issue in the case;
(4) The tribal membership status of the parties;
(5) Where the case arises;
(6) If the parties have by contract chosen a forum or the law
to be applied in the event of a dispute;
(7) The timing of the motion to dismiss or stay, taking into
account the parties’ and courts’ expenditures of time and
resources, and compliance with any applicable provisions
of either court’s scheduling orders;
(8) The court in which the action can be decided most expe-
ditiously;
(9) Such other factors as may be appropriate in the particular
case.20
To prevent a deadlock such as the one which occurred
between the two courts in Teague, the Tenth District Protocol
provides in Section 5(c) for a mechanism to select a third judge
drawn from a standing pool of four circuit court and four tribal
court judges. That judge then is directed to sit with the two
judges from the courts where the two actions are pending to
conduct a hearing de novo, at the close of which the three
judges are to deliberate and allocate jurisdiction on the basis of
the factors listed above.
Back in Madison, and mindful of the Tenth District’s
Protocol, a majority of the Supreme Court (“Teague III”)
reversed the Circuit Court’s refusal to reopen the lower court
judgment. The Court refrained from focusing its decision on a
race to the courthouse, or on formal constitutional provisions.
The protocol
signed by the
Tenth Judicial
District and four
Chippewa tribes
(Bad River, Lac
Courte Oreilles,
St.Croix and Red
Cliff) in December,
2001, was the first
of its kind.
21. Teague III, at ¶ 58.
22. Id.
23. Id., at ¶ 79:
The principles of comity applicable to state court-tribal court
relations are built upon the goal of fostering tribal self-govern-
ment through recognition of tribal justice mechanisms.
Consequently, the significance of the plaintiff’s choice of a forum
and the application and interpretation of state law are out-
weighed by the fact that the litigation involves tribal sovereignty
and the interpretation of tribal law, and that the material events
occurred on tribal land. Even where a circuit court had con-
ducted significant proceedings before the tribal court even began
to hear the case is outweighed by the tribal court’s institutional
interest in determining the validity of contracts made with the
tribe.
Id.
24. Id., at ¶ 70.
25. Id., at ¶ 71 and n.38.
26. Copies of the Ninth District Protocol may be obtained from the
District Court Administrator, Susan Byrns, (715) 842-3872, 2100
Stewart Avenue, Suite 310, Wausau, WI 54401.
27. Id.
Instead, Teague III clarified
that when state and tribal
courts exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter, and each
court knows of the other’s
proceedings, the full faith and
credit statute is not yet
applicable.21 Instead, each
court should stop its proceed-
ings, consult with the other,
and as a matter of comity
decide which court should
proceed.22
The Teague III Court fur-
ther instructed that when
comity principles are applied
in this circumstance, the
application is weighted toward the Tribal Court:23 “In the con-
text of state-tribal relations, principles of comity must be
applied with an understanding that the federal government is,
and the state courts should be, fostering tribal self-government
and tribal self-determination.”24 This instruction applies even
when the tribal entity has waived a claim of sovereignty in the
state court. It is an instruction that forces litigants and state
courts to recognize that judicial qualifications are determined
by the appointing sovereign, and not by other governments.
The Teague III majority then listed a host of factors from
various sources, including the Tenth District’s Protocol, noting
that the weight given each would vary from case to case:
1. Where the action was first filed and the extent to which the
case has proceeded in the first court;
2. The parties’ and courts’ expenditures of time and resources
in each court and the extent to which the parties have com-
plied with any applicable provisions of either court’s sched-
uling orders;
3. The relative burdens on the parties, including cost, access
to and admissibility of evidence and matters of process,
practice, and procedure, including whether the action will
be decided most expeditiously in tribal or state court; 
4. Whether the nature of the action implicates tribal sover-
eignty, including but not limited to, the following:
a. The subject matter of the litigation.
b. The identities and potential immunities of the parties.
5. Whether the issues in the case require application and
interpretation of a tribe’s law or state law;
6. Whether the case involves traditional or cultural maters of
the tribe;
7. Whether the location of material events giving rise to the
litigation is on tribal or state land;
8. The relative institutional or administrative interests of each
court;
9. The tribal membership status of the parties;
10.The parties’ contractual forum selection;
11.The parties’ contractual choice of the law to be applied;
12.Whether each court has jurisdiction over the dispute and
the parties and has determined its own jurisdiction;
13.Whether either jurisdiction has entered a final judgment that
conflicts with another judgment entitled to recognition.25
With the decision in Teague III, that case came to an end,
but its legacy continues.
A SECOND TRIBAL/STATE COURT JURISDICTIONAL
ALLOCATION PROTOCOL IS DEVELOPED
On July 28, 2005, the twelve counties of the Ninth Judicial
District and five Indian bands with reservations or property
within the district signed their own tribal/state protocol on the
judicial allocation of jurisdiction. The signatory tribes are the
Bad River Band, Forest County Potawatomi Community, Lac
du Flambeau Band, Sokaogon Chippewa Community (Mole
Lake) and Stockbridge-Munsee Band. The Ninth District
Protocol applies where there is concurrent jurisdiction in both
state and tribal court and provides for dismissal by either court
if it determines it lacks jurisdiction.26
Section 7 of the Ninth District Protocol enumerates the
same 13 factors identified in Teague III and provides that these
factors “shall be considered in determining which court shall
exercise jurisdiction.” The tie-breaking procedure is the same
as in the Tenth District Protocol.27
Notably, the Ninth District Protocol does not apply to one
tribe with a presence in that district, based on a federal dis-
tinction. Public Law 280 (28 U.S.C. section 1360) gives
Wisconsin courts civil jurisdiction over matters involving
Indians which arise in Indian country. The Menominee are a
non-P.L. 280 tribe – Wisconsin’s only such tribe – and as a
result, an assertion of jurisdiction by a Wisconsin court over a
claim arising in Indian country and brought by a non-Indian
against a Menominee tribal member would infringe that tribe’s
sovereignty. Because of its status as a non-P.L. 280 tribe, the
Menominee Tribe did not sign the Ninth District Protocol. 
[T]he twelve 
counties of the
Ninth Judicial
District and five
Indian bands with
reservations or
property within
the district signed
their own tribal/
state protocol on
the judicial 
allocation of 
jurisdiction.
22 Court Review - Volume 45 
Court Review - Volume 45 23
THE SECOND JURISDICTIONAL ALLOCATION
CONFERENCE IS HELD IN THE MOHR LITIGATION
In January, 2005, a Teague Conference was held in a case
arising out of a 2003 consultant contract the Forest County
Potawatomi Community’s (“FCPC”) Executive Council, but
not its General Council, entered into with James B. Mohr. “All
actions of the Executive Council are subject to review and
rescission by the General Council.”28 The four-year contract
was to pay Mohr, a recently retired state court judge, a substan-
tial sum for assisting the tribe with the development of its tribal
court system, a juvenile justice action plan and other related
programs. The contract contained a sovereign immunity waiver
and provided for arbitration in the event of a dispute. The
immunity waiver, however, was not implemented in accordance
with FCPC tribal law, which requires that the General Council
approve any waiver of the tribe’s sovereign immunity.
In January 2004, the tribe’s General Council rejected the
Mohr consultant contract. Efforts to reach a settlement were
unavailing and on April 21, 2004, Mohr’s counsel gave notice
of his intent to proceed with arbitration.
On May 6, 2004, the tribe commenced an action in FCPC
Tribal Court against Mr. Mohr,29 seeking to enjoin him from
commencing or pursuing arbitration and ultimately to declare
the contract void. Days later, Mohr began his own action in
Oneida County Circuit Court against the tribe,30 in an effort to
compel arbitration and challenge the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction
to adjudicate the dispute. At the same time Mohr filed a
motion for a conditional stay pending an “inter-jurisdictional
consultation.” Counsel for the tribe and Mohr agreed to take
no further action in their respective lawsuits to permit the con-
sultation to take place.
On July 25, 2004, a reserve judge sitting in Oneida County
Circuit Court sent a letter to the Chief Judge of the FCPC
Tribal Court, adopting the parties’ suggestion that a Teague
Conference be held after two rounds of briefing. Counsel
agreed that both actions should be stayed in the interim. They
also advised the judges that, unlike the protocol adopted by
the Tenth Judicial District, in the event there was a deadlock at
their Teague Conference, the parties would then confer as to
how it should be resolved.
The Teague Conference for the FCPC-Mohr cases was held
January 25, 2005, in a Wisconsin circuit court courthouse.
After oral argument, the proceedings were adjourned to permit
the two judges to deliberate. After deliberations the proceed-
ings resumed on the record. First the Tribal judge and then the
Circuit Court judge delivered his ruling. Both agreed that juris-
diction should be allocated to the FCPC Tribal Court, although
they reached their conclusions in a somewhat different way.
Judge Butterfield, as a judge of a tribal court of a sovereign
Indian nation who was not bound by decisions of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, used the nine factors set forth in
the August 3, 2004, draft protocol for the Ninth District,
which had been approved
by the state court judges
but had not yet been acted
upon by the tribal courts in
that district. The nine fac-
tors listed in the draft pro-
tocol are the same as those
in the Tenth District’s
Protocol. Judge Williams of
the Circuit Court, on the
other hand, applied Teague
III’s 13 factors. He then
entered a stay of any fur-
ther proceedings in his
court.
The interesting dynamic
underlying the FCPC-Mohr Teague Conference was that it was
convened in recognition of and reinforced by principles of
comity. The FCPC-Mohr conference also was guided by the
policy articulated by both the United States Supreme Court
and the Wisconsin Supreme Court that promoting tribal jus-
tice systems is essential to foster tribal self-government and
self-determination. Had the Circuit Court action been permit-
ted to proceed, it would have divested the Tribal Court of the
right to interpret tribal laws and the right to adjudicate chal-
lenges to its jurisdiction, both critical elements of the right of
tribal self-government. Under the federal exhaustion of tribal
remedies doctrine established by the United States Supreme
Court in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians,31 the Tribal Court must be allowed to address ques-
tions of its own jurisdiction and fully and finally adjudicate a
dispute before a party can challenge the existence of tribal
jurisdiction as a federal question in district court. As the
Teague III court held, “general principles of comity, including
principles of abstention, must be used to resolve” conflicts
between state and tribal courts.32
WISCONSIN’S NEW RULE ON DISCRETIONARY
TRANSFERS FROM STATE COURT TO TRIBAL COURT
The FCPC-Mohr case is the first known use of a Teague
Conference. Court staff believe that the protocols developed in
the Ninth and Tenth Districts have been used successfully by
courts and parties, but infrequently. Instead, it seemed that as
time went on, tribal and state courts have been using informal
approaches to resolve jurisdictional differences. As Judge
Brunner reports, the state and tribal courts with the most over-
lapping activity have, over time, developed a very good rela-
tionship, and in situations where both sides feel jurisdiction
may be questionable, the judges often give each other a phone
call to resolve where the litigation best belongs.33 Several state
court judges have held court in tribal courtrooms.34
Aware of this evolution, on July 24, 2007, the Wisconsin
[T]he state and tribal
courts with the most
overlapping 
activity... developed
a very good 
relationship, and
...the judges often
give each other a
phone call to resolve
where the litigation
best belongs.
28. CONST. OF FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMUNITY, WISCONSIN,
ART. V, §II.
29. Case No. 04-CV-27.
30. Case No. 04-CV-152.
31. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
32. Teague III, at ¶ 66.
33. Telephone Interview with Judge Edward Brunner, Wisconsin
Court of Appeals (June 2, 2009).
34. Id.
35. The Forum is a joint committee of representatives of state and
tribal courts established by the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to promote communication and cooperation
among Wisconsin’s state and tribal court systems.
36. See Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the District Courts tit.
1, § 10.02, Tribal Courts and Judgments, http://www.courts.state.
mn.us/Documents/0/Public/Rules/GRP_Tit_I_3-12-09.pdf.
37. Sup. Ct. Order No. 07-11-2008 WI 114, issued July 31, 2008, eff.
January 1, 2009.
38. WIS. STAT. § 801.54(2)(a)-(k) (West Supp. 2008).
39. WIS. STAT. § 801.54 cmt. (2008).
40. See WIS. STAT. § 801.54(2m) (2008); Sup. Ct. Order 7-11A, 2009
WI 63 (issued July 31, 2009, eff. July 31, 2009).
41. See, e.g., Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 47.10) (eff. Oct. 15, 2004);
California (Cal. Rules of Court 5.483) (eff. Jan. 1, 2008);
Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-126) (eff. May 30, 2002); Iowa
Director of State Courts sub-
mitted a Petition on behalf of
the State-Tribal Justice
Forum35 seeking promulga-
tion of a rule governing dis-
cretionary transfer of state
court cases to tribal court.
The Petition noted that the
State-Tribal Justice Forum
had learned of a number of
situations in which courts
were transferring cases in an
exercise of discretion as the
interests of justice require. Given the large number of pro se
tribal court litigants, particularly in family law matters, the
Forum advocated a user-friendly, discretionary transfer mecha-
nism that could be used when there is concurrent jurisdiction.
In his Petition, the Director of State Courts made reference
to research conducted by the State-Tribal Justice Forum on
how other states handle the concurrent civil jurisdiction. In
particular, the Forum, as well as the Petition, cited § 10.02 of
Rule 10 of the Minnesota General Rules of Practice for District
Courts. Title I, Section 10.02 outlines the factors to be consid-
ered when recognition of Tribal Court orders and judgments is
discretionary. The comment to Rule 10 provides that when
there is no applicable statute, recognition of Tribal Court
orders and judgments is governed by principles of comity.36
The Petition also cited State of Washington Court Rule 82.5(b)
on concurrent Tribal and Superior Court jurisdiction. That
rule authorizes a superior court to transfer an action to a Tribal
Court in the interests of justice, taking into account “the
nature of the action, the interests and identities of the parties,
the convenience of the parties and witnesses, whether state or
tribal law will apply to the matter in controversy, and the rem-
edy available in such Indian tribal court.”
The rule proposed by the Petition was adopted by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court on July 31, 2008, and became
effective January 1, 2009.37 Unlike the Teague Protocol, which
requires dual filings in both state and tribal courts, the new
WIS. STAT. § 801.5438 gives a circuit court, after notice and a
hearing on the record, the discretion to transfer an action to
tribal court when there is concurrent jurisdiction and when
transfer is warranted after consideration of all relevant factors,
including the following:
(a) Whether issues involve interpretation of tribal laws.
(b) Whether the action involves traditional or cultural matters
of the tribe.
(c) Whether a tribe is a party, or tribal sovereignty, jurisdiction
or territory is involved.
(d) The tribal membership status of the parties.
(e) Where the claim arose.
(f) Whether the parties have by contract chosen the forum or
law to be applied.
(g) The timing of any motion to transfer, taking into account
the expenditure of time and resources by the parties and
the court and compliance with any scheduling orders.
(h) The court in which the dispute can be decided most expe-
ditiously.
(i) The institutional and administrative interest of both
courts.
(j) The relative burdens on the parties, including cost, access
to and admissibility of evidence and where the action can
be heard and resolved most promptly. 
(k) Any other factors having a substantial bearing on the selec-
tion of a convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial.
As can be seen, these 11 factors are strikingly similar to the
13 points enumerated by the Teague III majority. Upon a dis-
cretionary transfer to tribal court, further proceedings in state
court are stayed for up to five years, subject to modification on
motion and notice to the parties as the interests of justice may
require. A discretionary transfer to tribal court may be
appealed as a matter of right.
The following comment to WIS. STAT. § 801.54, although
not adopted, may be consulted for guidance in interpreting it: 
The purpose of this rule is to enable circuit courts to
transfer civil actions to tribal courts in Wisconsin as effi-
ciently as possible where appropriate. In considering the
factors under sub. (2), the circuit court shall give partic-
ular weight to the constitutional rights of the litigants and
their rights to assert all available claims and defenses.39
DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER RULE IS AMENDED
After consideration at several open administrative confer-
ences, the Wisconsin Supreme Court on July 31, 2009,
adopted an amendment to § 801.54, effective as of that date,
that permits a circuit court on its own motion or that of any
party, to transfer a post-judgment child support, custody or
placement provision of an action in which the state is the real
party in interest to a tribal court located in Wisconsin which is
receiving Federal funding to operate child support programs.
Once the circuit court has made an explicit finding of concur-
rent jurisdiction, transfer will occur unless a party timely
objects or establishes good cause to prevent transfer. If there is
a timely objection, the court must hold a hearing on the record
to consider § 801.54(2) factors.40 Permitting such transfers in
child support cases is consistent with the practice in a number
of other states.41
The purpose of this
rule is to enable
circuit courts to
transfer civil
actions to tribal
courts in Wisconsin
as efficiently as
possible where
appropriate.
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CONCLUSIONS
Although we are not aware of any post-Mohr formal Teague
Conferences, we understand that the principles of comity iden-
tified in Teague III have been significant in facilitating discus-
sions and cooperation between state and tribal court judges
faced with duplicative litigation. In the short time since Wis.
Stat. § 801.54 took effect, there is no data on the frequency of
its usage. We anticipate that § 801.54 transfers will be made
when it makes sense to do so. Such transfers can be done with-
out the formality of a Teague Conference, which, in any event,
cannot bind a tribal court. Section § 801.54(2m), the 2009
amendment, was adopted at the behest of the Oneida Indian
Nation, which had added a child support enforcement agency
to its judicial system.42 This amendment will facilitate transfer
of post-judgment child support, custody and placement mat-
ters of which it has been estimated there may be more than
4,000 statewide.43
In the future, parties and courts in the Ninth and Tenth
Judicial Districts have at their disposal formal and informal
mechanisms to avoid the race-to-judgment problems pre-
sented in Teague. If non-child support parallel actions should
arise involving the non-signatory Menominee Tribe, or with
tribes located in other judicial districts such as the Ho-Chunk
Nation or Oneida Indian Nation, the parties and judges or
judicial officers may convene a Teague Conference on an ad
hoc, voluntary basis, not unlike what occurred in Mohr, but
they also are free to use the discretionary transfer rule of Wis.
Stat. § 801.54. Absent a controlling protocol with a tie-break-
ing mechanism, there remains some risk of a deadlock between
the two judges, as occurred in Teague. But the federal tribal
exhaustion doctrine, as formulated by the United States
Supreme Court and recognized by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in its Teague decisions, makes deference to proceeding in
tribal court more likely. Likewise, the development of the dis-
cretionary transfer rule itself reflects that the fruit of sustained
communication and cooperation between state and tribal court
judges can yield not only formal protocols, but a more colle-
gial, cooperative relationship that facilitates informal means of
deciding to transfer a case from one court’s sovereign jurisdic-
tion to another. In short, the informal, cooperative process has
become more useful than the protocol. This is progress.
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(IOWA CODE § 232B.5) (adopted 2003); Michigan (Mich. Court
Rule 3.980) (eff. May 1, 2003); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 260.771)
(eff. July 1, 2007); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1504) (adopted
1985); New York (N.Y. Ch. 55 CONS. LAWS Art. 2 § 39) (eff. Dec.
21, 2005); Oklahoma (10 OKLA. STATS. Ch. 1B § 40.4) (eff. Sept.
1, 1994); Oregon (34 OR. REV. STAT. 419C.058) (adopted 2003);
South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-15.1) (adopted 2005);
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.10.034, 13.34.070,
13.32A.152 and 26.33.040) (all eff. June 10, 2004).
42. Recently available federal funds have encouraged a number of
tribal courts to develop their own child support enforcement
agencies, which tend to pursue enforcement more effectively than
over-burdened state courts are able.  See Telephone Interview
(June 2, 2009), supra note 33. 
43. Telephone interview with A. John Voelker, Wisconsin Director of
State Courts (May 26, 2009); D. Ziemer, Cases Can Transfer to
Tribal Court, WIS. L.J, May 11, 2009.
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION FUTURE CONFERENCES
2010 Midyear Meeting
Tucson, Arizona
May 19-21
Loews Ventana Canyon Resort
$189 single/double
2010 Annual Conference
Denver, Colorado
Westin Tabor Center
October 3-8
$205 single/double
2011 Midyear Meeting
Hilton Head, South Carolina
Westin Hilton Head Island
April 14-16
$209 single/double
2011 Annual Conference
San Diego, California
Westin Gaslamp
September 11-16
$249 single/double
